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Troubling 
 
Gregory White, Smith College, gwhite@smith.edu  
 
The argument is often made that climate change needs to be taken seriously 
because it will trigger “climate refugees” that will threaten international borders. This is 
now a common refrain in a wide array of arguments about climate change – not only 
from “dark green” environmentalists or mainstream climate scientists, but also from 
national security officials.  
For example, in a speech delivered in Alaska in September 2015, US President 
Barack Obama pointed to the melting Arctic as a matter of national security for the 
United States and highlighted that climate refugees and migration are a particular threat. 
There’s not going to be a nation on this Earth that’s not impacted 
negatively [by climate change]. People will suffer. Economies will suffer. 
Entire nations will find themselves under severe, severe problems. More 
drought; more floods; rising sea levels; greater migration; more 
refugees; more scarcity; more conflict.  
Obama added, in apocalyptic tones, an explicit reference to cross-border refugees: 
…[I]f we do nothing to keep the glaciers from melting faster, and oceans 
from rising faster, and forests from burning faster, and storms from 
growing stronger, we will condemn our children to a planet beyond their 
capacity to repair: Submerged countries. Abandoned cities. Fields no 
longer growing. Indigenous peoples who can’t carry out traditions that 
stretch back millennia. Entire industries of people who can’t practice 
their livelihoods. Desperate refugees seeking the sanctuary of nations 
not their own. Political disruptions that could trigger multiple conflicts 
around the globe (Obama September 1, 2015). 
Such invocations can obviously appeal to fearful electorates anxious about national 
security as it pertains to immigrants and refugees. Not only is there close media 
coverage of Europe’s 2015-2016 refugee crisis and the proposal to build a wall on the 
Mexican border, but the public is also exposed to popular movies and novels that have 
the dystopic trope of hordes of refugees assaulting borders. Movies such as Children of 
Men (2006), Elysium (2013), and Snowpiercer (2014) feature scenes of desperate 
refugees straining security barriers. As Drezner (2014) suggests, one might even 
consider World War Z (2013) and its depictions of border assault by implacable zombies 
as an example of this public imaginary. Young adult literature such as The Hunger 
Games franchise or literature by celebrated novelists Margaret Atwood and Barbara 
Kingsolver have also used displaced peoples in their imaginings of the future.  
This essay argues, first, that viewing climate change as a threat multiplier that 
will produce “climate refugees” is problematic because it unduly accentuates migrants 
and refugees as an ostensible security threat. Second, it asserts that the evidence of 
large numbers of people moving toward borders in the past (and in the future) because 
of environmental change remains empirically questionable. Third and finally, it claims 
that such discourse distracts attention from more fruitful policy responses. There is no 
doubt that climate change is a very real phenomenon and a deep menace to the 
ecosystems in which humans and other species exist. Solving its challenges have been 
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and will be hard enough. Nevertheless, injecting refugee and migration politics into the 
debate unproductively furthers an agenda focused on militarized border security. 
 
Evolution of the Discourse 
In the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers argued that the environment and 
climate change presented challenges to national security (Gore 1992; Homer-Dixon 
1991; Deligiannis 2013). The North Atlantic security establishment itself was initially 
resistant to this expansion of security beyond its traditional focus on strategic doctrine 
and force projection. In the late 90s, however, European defense ministries began to 
articulate that climate change did indeed pose a national security threat. And by the mid-
00s, the Pentagon and US security establishment began to join the argument that 
climate change was a security concern, specifically citing climate refugees as one of the 
clear threats (Schwartz and Randall 2003).  
In its early years, the Bush-Cheney White House and its Republican counterparts 
in Congress denied that climate change was a real phenomenon. Nevertheless, security 
bureaucracies and think tanks in Washington increasingly asserted that not only was it 
real, but that it also presented security challenges (Campbell and others 2007). By 2008, 
the last year of the Bush-Cheney Administration, the Director of National Intelligence 
released a National Intelligence Assessment on the Implications of Climate Change to 
2030. It, too, pointed to climate refugees as a particular threat to international and 
national security (National Intelligence Council 2008). Other North Atlantic security 
bodies promulgated similar reports (Solana and European Commission 2008; German 
Advisory Council on Global Change 2007; Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 
of the UK Ministry of Defence 2007). 
The reasoning for these arguments is rather straightforward and seemingly 
intuitive. Although the future scope and dimensions of climate change is unpredictable, 
its impact will nonetheless be significant. The logic seems to follow, then, that 
deterioration in ecosystems will displace people and prompt them to move toward 
international borders. Whether labeled environmental refugees, climate migrants, 
climate-induced migration, or sometimes even “climigrants,” this displacement would 
likely emerge from three causes. First, the increased incidences of catastrophic events 
such as typhoons or hurricanes would devastate communities; second, coastal or island 
inundations would render land uninhabitable; and, third, gradual onset climate change in 
the form of drought would undermine livelihoods (Bates 2002).  
Not surprisingly, the environmental left has found this kind of discourse 
appealing. It had long argued à la Homer-Dixon that environmental change prompted 
displacement and conflict (El-Hinnawi 1985; Black 2001; Kibreab 1997). Climate change 
as a particular kind of environmental change is (and would be in this logic) a new set of 
“forcings” that would deeply accelerate such dynamics. Estimates of the future 
displacement ranged from 200 million people to as many as one billion, with time 
horizons often uncertain (Myers 2001; Christian Aid 2007; International Organization for 
Migration 2008). 
And once the North Atlantic security establishment started to take up the 
argument, as noted above, environmentalists subsequently cited the official reports as 
confirmation of climate change’s empirical validity. If the Pentagon is “taking climate 
change seriously,” so went the reasoning, others should, too. After all, no one could 
accuse the security establishment of being anti-capitalist or naïve tree huggers.  
For environmentalists passionate about social justice, the argument that climate 
change would unduly affect vulnerable peoples is especially compelling because it 
accentuates the deep inequalities at the heart of the international political economy. The 
fact that greenhouse gases are overwhelmingly emitted by advanced-industrialized 
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countries and would cause the dislocation of hundreds of millions of people raises 
crucial humanitarian questions and/or R2P-style obligations. In some instances, climate 
refugees have even been depicted as the “human face of climate change” in an attempt 
to humanize climate change’s impact. Michael Nash’s 2010 documentary film Climate 
Refugees is a perfect example of that genre although it, too, ultimately emphasizes 
climate refugees as a security threat.  
 
Pitfalls 
Holding aside for the moment the question of the empirical evidence for 
displacement attributable to climate change – addressed below – why would it be a 
problem if national security establishments adopted neo-Malthusian arguments and 
treated climate change as a “threat multiplier” (Levy 1995; Smith 2007; Dalby, 2009)? 
The reason is that framing climate change as a national security issue gives rise to an 
“anticipatory regime” that neither contributes to policies to mitigate greenhouse gases 
nor promotes adaptation to already occurring and future climate change (Hartmann 
2014). It sets in motion a future-oriented logic that assumes the worst, thereby 
enhancing the potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy. In other words, thinking in terms of 
the worst-case scenario is itself the worst-case scenario. As Adams, Murphy and Clarke 
write:  
Anticipatory regimes offer a future that may or may not arrive, is always 
uncertain and yet is necessarily coming and so therefore always 
demanding a response... Anticipation is not just betting on the future; it is 
a moral economy in which the future sets the conditions of possibility for 
action in the present, in which the future is inhabited in the present. 
Through anticipation, the future arrives as already formed in the present, 
as if the emergency has already happened (Adams et al., 2009, 236). 
This notion of “the future [setting] the conditions of possibility for action in the present… 
as if the emergency has already happened” is exactly the fearful, catastrophist vibe that 
securitized discourse seeks to deploy. It endeavors to make an apocalyptic future as 
happening right now and immediately locked in emergency. Injunctions are invoked in 
ethical terms: we must be prepared, vigilant, and alert; the “perpetual ethicized state of 
imperfect knowing” renders us obedient (Adams et al., 2009, 254). It can also cultivate 
an acceptance of anxious preparedness and even violence as a political stance. 
Again, thinking of climate refugees as an inevitable outgrowth of climate change 
does not lead to political support for the mitigation of GHGs nor adaptation to climate 
change “already in the pipeline.” The more likely response is a platform of policies such 
as enhancing border security, bolstering authoritarian “transit states” on the periphery of 
advanced-industrialized countries, and maintaining force projection capabilities in order 
to respond to “hotspots” with displaced populations. 
The steady deepening of border security over the last 25 years is suggestive of 
this process. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, countries have vigorously pursued 
the construction of fences, walls, and high-tech surveillance as a means of asserting 
control over borders (Brown 2010; Andersson 2014). Although these structures have 
obviously not been erected in the name of stopping “climate refugees,” an anticipatory 
regime built on their portent will only reaffirm their political appeal. Climate refugees fit 
neatly into the “rhetorical amalgamation” and interchangeable anti-immigrant, anti-
refugee, and anti-terrorist discourses that serve to legitimate walls (Vallet and David, 
2014). Military and security firms that provide border security often lobby assiduously for 
contracts from governments (Lemberg-Pederson 2013). Their goal is to politically 
legitimate the necessity of the services they provide and, in effect, create the need for 
their own business (Buxton and Hayes, 2015). 
 4 
A recent example of this dangerous rhetoric is US presidential candidate Donald 
Trump’s rally cry of “I will build a great wall and have Mexico pay for it.” Trump has 
denied the mainstream scientific evidence that climate change is occurring. And his 
justification for a wall is a shifting potpourri of thwarting economic migrants, repelling 
refugees, and fighting ISIS. But when he and others in his ideological formation do 
concede that climate change is happening, enhanced walled security against climate 
refugees will inevitably be the logical outgrowth.  
“Transit countries” on the periphery of advanced-industrialized countries – e.g., 
Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Turkey – have also long been enlisted in efforts to 
interdict migrants seeking access to the US and EU. Such countries have traded their 
cooperation on migration interdiction for economic assistance and preferential terms of 
trade. In the case of countries like Morocco and Turkey, they have parlayed their roles 
as transit states to deepen their diplomatic credential (Kimball 2007; White 2011; Düvell 
2012). The case of Libya’s Qaddafi and his cooperation on migration interdiction from 
2003-2011 especially illustrates its precarious and contradictory nature. And the April 
2016 deal between the EU and Turkey, in which Turkey agreed to take back migrants 
from Greece in exchange for financial aid and the right for Turkish citizens to travel in the 
Schengen zone for 90 days without a visa is also part of this fraught process. The 
domestic politics of transit states are becoming more authoritarian, in no small part 
because of efforts by North Atlantic powers to externalize borders.  
 
Uncertain Empirical Evidence 
What is especially problematic (and perhaps even ironic) in using a threat-
defense logic for climate refugees is that scholarship in migration and demography has 
indicated that people affected by environmental change – whether it be gradual onset 
climate change or catastrophic events – are actually less able or inclined to move 
(Henry, Schoumaker, and Beauchemin 2004; Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire 2007; Perch-
Nielson, Bättig, and Imboden 2008). Migrating great distances requires physical strength 
and economic resources, something that most people affected by environmental change 
rarely have. The literature also argues that people who do move because of 
environmentally-induced displacement tend to either return to their homes to rebuild or, if 
they are unable to do so, move to nearby cities or destinations (Gray 2010; Gray 2009).  
There is empirical evidence that climate change can indeed contribute to or 
exacerbate conflict (Dumaine and Mintzer, 2015). It would be naïve to assume 
otherwise. But, if people seek “the sanctuary of nations not their own,” as President 
Obama worried, it is often in nearby poor countries – not distant advanced-industrialized 
countries. 
Two brief examples illustrate the complexity of this issue. First, the 2006 drought 
in Syria – an occurrence strongly correlated to climate change – undoubtedly helped to 
catalyze the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011. And some analysts have linked the 
drought to the 2015-16 European refugee crises. Nevertheless, it is important to stress 
that sophisticated analyses emphasize that the drought was a contributing ecological 
factor and not the sole cause of the civil conflict (Kelley et al., 2015). Other factors are 
far more salient – i.e., Hafez and Bashar al-Assad regimes’ economic and social policies 
over many decades, international interventions (namely, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003), the aftermath of the 2008 fiscal crisis and international food commodity prices, 
and the spreading upheavals associated with 2011 Arab spring (Randall, 2016; Femia 
and Werrell, 2012). Also, in keeping with the argument above, the vast bulk of Syrian 
refugees have stayed within the region; they cannot or do not want to leave Lebanon, 
Jordan and Turkey. They are not straining European borders.  
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A second example is the Sahel region of Africa and its experience with climate 
change. Tom Friedman’s April 2016 trilogy of articles in the New York Times had the 
clichéd title, “Out of Africa.” Friedman’s articles are peppered with phrases like “surging 
migrant tide” and “one way or another [Africans] will try to get to Europe” and “the 
headwaters of the immigration flood [are] now flowing from Africa to Europe via Libya” 
and “when the US and NATO toppled [Qaddafi] they essentially uncorked Africa.” Not 
only do the articles perfectly illustrate an alarmist, neo-Malthusian anticipatory regime 
(Verhoeven, 2014), they are scant on empirical evidence about the impact of climate 
change on migration patterns. The third article begins, “You can learn everything you 
need to know about the main challenge facing Africa today by talking to just two people 
in Senegal: the rapper and the weatherman.” Would that it were so simple. 
As argued above, most displaced peoples in sub-Saharan Africa do not move 
northward toward Europe but instead move south to the Gulf of Guinea, straining the 
massive urban centers along the Atlantic (Andersson, 2014). This represents profound 
challenges for human security and sustainable development – and potential 
humanitarian challenges, too. Friedman does explicitly write that he is not advocating the 
building of walls around the North Atlantic. Nevertheless, hyping the African “migration 
wave,” as he does unfortunately abets support for border agencies such as Frontex or 
the US Customs and Border Protection. 
 
Conclusion 
In The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the Future, Oreskes and 
Conway cleverly imagine a Chinese historian writing 300 years in the future. Their 
fictional historian recounts the ecological ravages that took place in the late 21st century:  
Although records for this period are incomplete, it is likely that during the 
Mass Migration [in the 2070s], 1.5 billion people were displaced around 
the globe, either directly from the impacts of sea level rise or indirectly 
from other impacts of climate change, including the secondary dislocation 
of inland peoples whose towns and villages were overrun by eustatic 
refugees [i.e., rising seas]. Dislocation contributed to the Second Black 
Death, as a new strain of the bacterium Yersinia pestis emerged in 
Europe and spread to Asia and North America (Oreskes and Conway 
2014, 70).  
It is an apocalyptic, biblical-style narrative of what will happen: floods, plagues, and, yes, 
hordes of refugees dislocated because of climate change. 
Obviously, refugees and migrations have long been a hot-button issue in 
advanced-industrialized countries. To invoke environmental refugees or climate-induced 
migration as a threat or concern is not only empirically questionable, but it also prompts 
a threat-defense logic that merges into anti-immigrant and anti-refugee discourses.  
 Some suggest that the exclusionary tendency implicit in a security turn for 
climate refugees has a racial dimension (Baldwin 2013; Baldwin 2012a; Baldwin 2012b) 
while others argue that nativist frameworks align with notions of defending civilization 
against invading barbarian hordes (Bettini 2013, 63-72). The rise of Trump and other 
anti-immigrant rightwing parties show that popular sentiment is certainly susceptible to 
fear mongering about refugees. If/when the political right becomes fully convinced that 
climate change is real – likely via arguments from defense bureaucracies and 
contractors – it will surely embrace the “climate refugee” line of argument. Further 
support for a politics of climate change based on exclusionary nativism and a militarized 
survivalism will undoubtedly follow.  
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